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The "Great War" and its "Comeback" Against the backdrop of the 100 th anniversary, Russia's evident interest in the history of the years from 1914 to 1917/18 was often perceived as a revival of a long suppressed and unwanted commemoration. In 2014, Russia, it seemed, rediscovered World War One. A "war forgotten" was remembered in various exhibitions, scientific and popular publications, illustrated books, TVdocumentary films, and even in the cinema. The way the Great War was exhibited, characterized, interpreted, and adapted for the screen in some cases more or less obviously corresponded to Russia's present-day self-portrayal as "home of the brave." Those brave men and women dominated the filmic narratives of WWI in 2014, and the general public must have been convinced that Russian soldiers' overwhelming patriotism and readiness to make sacrifices during WWI would result in a just and well-deserved victory, unless their enemies and allies were more or less satanic combatants (especially the German Empire) and deceitful traitors (France and Great Britain). According to this interpretation, Russia was abused by its allies and had to carry the major burden of the war. Obviously, an analogy between past and present was intended by the architects of a strong patriotism and a new patriotic culture in Vladimir Putin's Russia, which was ostracized by the USA and the European Union since at least its proceeding in the Crimea and in the Ukraine. The message is clear: Russia stood alone during the First World War, cheated by its allies and beaten only because of a revolution that was supported by the Germans, and it stands alone now, misapprehended and wrongly stigmatized by the rest of the world, which, without plausible reason, considers itself morally and ethically superior to Russia. In 2014, on 1 August, when Putin inaugurated a monument to Russian soldiers of the First World War, he offered a "stab-in-theback explanation of Tsarist Russia's defeat and collapse, " alluding "of course, to the Bolsheviks" who had been sent to Russia by the Germans. 1 In doing this, the Russian President more or less adopted the perception of emigrated Tsarist officers who had interpreted the lost war as a "German-Bolshevik plot to destroy the nation. " any case, Putin spoke of "'re-establishing the unbroken continuity of our history, ' incorporating the First World War's 'sacred memory' into the official accounts of Russia´s history.
[…] Amid its ongoing war against Ukraine, the Kremlin is reaching into history to recuperate yet another militarist narrative for popular consumption. " 3 There are many critical and stimulating analyses of Russia's past and current commemorative culture and the official conception of history that was repeatedly modified even in the Soviet era. 4 After 1989 and the following fundamental changes that Eastern Europe, including the USSR, faced, a mere reversal of former interpretations by communist doctrines in regard to the history before and after the Bolsheviks seized power was an evident temptation for those countries. In post-Soviet Russia, historiography ran through various phases of reorientation. Putin's Russia obviously did not abandon communist interpretations of the past as a whole, in order to adapt them for its own purposes. As a result, Stalin, for example, remains the "father of the nation" who led Soviet people to a glorious victory against German barbarism between 1941 and 1945. Historiography and the conception of history in today's Russia are not free from contradictions. Still accepted communist interpretations of history and a reinterpretation of communist history as an antipode of former narratives are in juxtaposition with each other, but they somehow coexist. Moreover, popular interpretations of history introduce additional dimensions. But all of those variations that are initiated or accepted by official Russia, notwithstanding the lack of stringent reflections, share the same intended purpose: the strengthening of patriotism, completed by the advice to distrust the world beyond the borders of Russia.
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In regard to the appraisal of the role of the Tsarist army, recent Russian fiction and documentary films have made a distinct turning away from former communist perceptions. Nonetheless, there are some striking continuities to Soviet cinema as, for instance, the near complete absence of Austria-Hungary.
The Tsarist Empire and the War on the Screen
After 1945, the so-called "Habsburg myth" played an important role in the process of identity in the Second Austrian Republic. While World War One itself was largely neglected in cultural So, how did Tsarist cinematic propaganda portray the Danube monarchy, whose conflict with Serbia figured at the beginning of a European war that broadened to a world wide struggle? Whom did Russian cinema blame for the outbreak of the conflict that, in the end, swept away the Romanovs and their Empire? Who was deemed to be "worse" or more "condemnable"? The German Empire or the Danube monarchy? And was Russian film production able to comply with the requirements of an effective propaganda?
The war seriously affected Russian cinema: "On the eve of the conflict nearly 90 percent of film productions shown in Russia had come from abroad."
10 Before the war, a large number of films distributed in Russia had been of German origin. After the outbreak of hostilities, French film companies in Russia especially film production increased rapidly. On the other hand, "it would be a mistake to underestimate the profound influence of Western European filmmaking had overall in Russian filmmakers and audiences. " 13 German companies, however, were forced to shut down their production, and German theater owners and distributors were exiled. In 1915, all German films were banned.
14 Tsarist propaganda identified Germany as a responsible aggressor and as the most dangerous enemy, "the one against which the greatest patriotic efforts had to be directed. " 15 Germans turned out to be the main target of people's anger in Russian metropoles, and anti-German riots seemed to express the degree of hate toward the enemy, including the German minority in Russia. 16 Russian propaganda had to go all out to shape a convincing concept of the enemy. Finally, "convincing" meant to present a primitive and distorted image. Germany and its "Kaiser" were demonized, and Wilhelm was portrayed as the "Antichrist. "
19 In a feature film of the same title (Antichrist), the German Emperor acted like a real war. The psychological function was clearly more important than the historical authenticity of the episodes. In this respect, it should be noted that 'German horrors' were already being advertised in a film produced at the very outbreak of the war, before any atrocities had been reported. "
26 It has to be noted that the Russian audience, seemingly already before the war, preferred more dramatic and morbid films than the Western moviegoers: Russia's movie studios had "manufactured dreams that audiences in other cultures would have considered nightmares. " 27 Obviously, people found "unhappy endings" more consolatory than "happy endings" that were far from real life. going on at the theaters of War of their allies. 33 Undoubtedly, footages delivered by France or Great Britain outnumbered Russian newsreels to give an impression of the war. But, obviously, at least in 1914-15, Russian feature as well as documentary films on war crimes committed by the enemies did not completely omit the Western Front. After all, to show enemy barbarity on the screen was a matching part to press propaganda, where news about cruelties of the adversary had become ubiquitous.
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Violence against Tsarist prisoners of war in Austria-Hungary was picked up by Russian propaganda, which published various pamphlets or reports of soldiers who succeeded in escaping. It is not amazing, that atrocities committed by Austrian-Hungarian soldiers did also reach the screen. 35 Only few weeks after the outbreak of war the Kine-zhurnal announced the release of the feature film Tsivilizovannye varvary (Civilized barbarians), where Austrian soldiers arrested a defenseless young woman and only at the last moment were restrained from shooting an old man who was suspected to be a spy. Interestingly, at the end of the description of the film in the Kine-zhurnal, the old man is dooming the "German hangmen" ("palacham-nemtsam") and not the Austrian ones. 36 Another movie, which was also produced by the company of A. O. Drankov, is described in the same issue of the mentioned zhurnal and deals with the very first period of the war, too: Za tsarja i otechestvo ili liudi-brat´ia (For Tsar and fatherland). It shows the situation at the frontier to Austria-Hungary shortly after the hostilities had started. The Austrians are brutal, but they act cowardly, unsuccessfully trying to incite the different nations against the Russians: "Russians, Jews, Georgians, Ingush: all are fighting to save the home country. " 37 Generally, the Austrian brutes are of German or Polish origin. Concentrating on those nations, the propaganda corresponded with existent animosity and distrust. It was plausible that the scene of anti-Austrian feature films was mainly situated in the neighboring Austrian crownland Galicia, with its multifaceted ethnic conflicts. Due to Germany's part as the aggressor to blame the most for the outbreak of war it makes sense that Russian wartime feature films mostly focused on Germany and the Germans, who were transgressing "all moral and religious bounds." 38 On the other hand, there are no studies on Russian film production in wartime that are trying to find out if there were significant differences in presenting either the German or the Austrian or the GermanAustrian (German speaking Austrians/Deutschösterreicher) enemies on the screen. A first and rough analysis of Russian wartime feature films, based on Russian film journals published between 1914 and 1917 and filmographies for this period, supports the assumption that patriotic feature films dealing with "anti-German plots" predominate. But is has to be stated that the "German preponderance" in comparison with Austria-Hungary's presence is less striking than supposed-at least at the beginning of war.
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Tsarist filmic propaganda used traditional stereotypes of the enemy states and intensified and even exaggerated them to the point of a burlesque: "As in other warring nations, enemy leaders became convenient personifications and focal points of broader sets of clichés.
[…] Images of a weak and crumbling empire, expressing imperial rivalry with Austria, were projected onto the figure of the old and frail Franz Joseph. " 40 But did the Habsburg monarchy, which was considered to be weak and damned to crumble, appear to be less dangerous than the "German huns"? And In 1932, the magazine Proletarskoe kino analyzed Russian wartime propaganda and asserted that the Germans had been portrayed as barbarians, whereas the Austrians had been described as cowards and scoundrels. 45 As I have already shown in connection with Russian film productions shortly after the outbreak of war, there are some examples that illustrate that Austrians were considered to be cruel and merciless as well, notwithstanding portraying Franz Joseph as an old and broken-hearted man. In fact, there was no need for Russian propaganda to present the Austrian enemies as less damnable than the German ones. Above all, the oppression of Russia's "Slavonic brothers" by Habsburg authorities served as a drastic example of the wickedness of the neighbor. This, for example, correlated with a film that was released in 1916 and advertised by the company Gomon as "vigorous drama. Austrian brutality is also the main subject in a feature film on Czechs who had acquired Russian citizenship and united in a "legion of victory or death. " The film, titled Druzhina pobedy ili smerti, showed the tragic fate of "Czech heroes" who fought against Austrian oppressors and had to face the death penalty when being caught by the Austrians. In fact, "some 10 per cent of Czech prisoners volunteered" for the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia. 48 The film Druzhina pobedy ili smerti was announced as an impressive example for the struggle between Slavs and Germans. reveal "before the audience … 'scandalous and blatant horrors' ," with the exception of "almost colorless, grey episodes in which the nightmare of reality appears so clearly."
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Whereas the treason of former Austrian citizens was interpreted as a heroic act, espionage was either damned or appreciated, depending on the question who was spying and for whom: "Espionage and treason fitted nicely into a wave of detective novels and films that swept over the Western world and Russia alike. " 52 Many of these films merely adapted the war to an established taste, but some contained more or less elaborate patriotic messages. In fact, there were a lot of spy films that focused on German espionage in particular. 53 The writer and son of Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia, Konstantin Breshko-Breshkovskii, succeeded as the author of some of those spy films, where male and female spies were trying to obtain secrets about Russian warfare. Breshko-Breshkovskii appeared as a screenplay writer for a film, titled Grafinia-shpionka (avstrijskaia avantiura). The film was released only few days before the war broke out, and unlike the majority of spy films, concentrated on espionage of Austrian and not German provenience.
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Spy films perfectly suited to a popular taste that, from the very beginning of the war, preferred plain entertainment and "the usual fare that had been popular before the war. "
55 Feature films with war themes "were the crude and sensationalist fruits of savage competition among film companies. Superlatives of terror, baseness, Sovetskii Ėkran, the enemies of Russia in "The World War" simply appeared as "imperialists. " The audience, however, was confronted with an elephant from a "German zoo" who had to replace a railroad engine.
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Denise Youngblood emphasizes "the extremely tangential role the Great War played" in revolutionary films like, for example, Eisenstein´s famous October (1928). She stresses that many of the revolutionary films included only some references to World War One, "but by no stretch could they be labelled 'war films' in Youngblood nor Petrone are interested in identifying the "enemy" in the respective productions either as Germans or as Austrians/ Hungarians. They, more or less, "silently" accept that Soviet films concentrated on the Germans, often portrayed as proletarian comrades, abused by imperialism and nationalism and eventually "enlightened" and purified by experiencing communist solidarity. with its alternative titles Janosh vernëtsja domoj or Janosh priedet zaftra (Janosh is coming home [tomorrow] ) is, it seems, a more than rare example of the Danube monarchy's "life after death" in Soviet interwar film productions. 80 In sum, in many Soviet films on the First World War, there is, as A.M. Belogor´ev points out, an absence of "the enemy." 81 Cinema was not able to make comprehensible what World
War One was about. The First World War more and more became "an ahistorical symbol of imperialist" and, finally, "fascist, war." 82 Nevertheless, the "imperialists" are Germans rather than Austrians, and in regard to "fascists," the connotation is obvious. Moreover, it has to be taken into account that due to Germany's role concerning Lenin's return to Russia and its intransigence in regard to the peace negotiations, the anti-German climate in revolutionary Russia even increased, whereas the Habsburg monarchy appeared as a more or less moderate contingent that was ready to accept compromises. This perception continued to exist and, as a result, dominated Soviet Russia's attitude towards "Germans and Austrians," too. Furthermore, the filmic concentration on the Germans as adversaries in the conflict shown corresponded to the Bolsheviks' constant interest in German politics and developments, while the Habsburg Empire had ceased to exist and the Austrians had turned into citizens of a small and weak state in the heart of Europe. Germany still played an important role in European politics and in Moscow's plannings; Austria and its mediocre Communist Party were only third-rate. 83 It did not match with Bosheviks' "didactic" understanding of cinema to restore to life a "dead enemy," instead of dealing with an existing danger. 84 Based on the films seen by the authoress of this article and due to the characterization of the films in Soviet journals, there can be no doubt that AustriaHungary in Soviet interwar feature films with references to the First World War has either completely vanished or left only vague traces. Furthermore, the remembrance of the First World War in general began to fade and then disappeared. Films that picked up the issue of World War One were considered to be behind the times and therefore needless. Already at the end of the 1920s, the Communist Party attempted "to bring political order to Soviet cinema and direct it along a secure ideological path. " Film productions had to answer Communist demands in regard to an adequate entertainment of the masses: conflict, cinema was called upon not to copy Western pacifism or neutralize the German-Soviet antagonism on behalf a proletarian solidarity, as Boris Barnet for Okraina was criticized.
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Even more abrasively attacked than Barnet was the director of Sniper, Semëon Timoshenko, whom M. Korol´ in the journal Proletarskoe kino accused of having totally ignored whether his interpretation of the war was compatible with Lenin's doctrine in regard to warfare. Korol's comments on Timoshenko and his work were crushing. He argued that Timoshenko´s mindset in fact had nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism and its attitude towards questions of peace and war. Sniper, he alleged, was an example of Western "Remarquism," completely neglecting the importance of class conflicts. 91 Lewis Milestone's film adaptation of All Quiet on the Western Front was not shown "publicly" in the Soviet Union, 92 but in a hypertrophic manner the movie served as example of Western mendaciousness in regard to pacifistic films. The Soviet people had to be indoctrinated that the only country that really wanted peace was, of course, the Soviet Union. Various factors are responsible for the marginalization and, finally, the disappearance of World War I-related films from the Soviet screen in the 1930s. Karen Petrone in this connection refers to "many bureaucratic and ideological forces and economic constraints within the Soviet Union pushing against continued emphasis on 1945-2014 "The cataclysm of World War II forever changed the meaning and also the name of World War I in the Soviet Union as in the rest of Europe. In the last years of Stalin´s reign, the overwhelming task of rebuilding the country despite the loss of perhaps as many as twenty-seven million people overwhelming eclipsed the remembrance of World War I. " 95 In the 1990s, Russian cinema turned to various themes and started to rethink also the Soviet past. Nikita Mikhalkov's Utomlënnye solntsem (Burnt by the Sun, 1994), for instance, depicted the fate of a senior Red Army officer and his family during the "Great Purges, " and The Thief (1997, directed by Pavel Chukhrai) showed a young mother and her son's everyday struggle for survival in the late 1940s through the early 1950s. Finally, Russian cinema and TV discovered history before Russia had become communist. In doing so, Russian films followed the official course of a gradual rehabilitation of the Tsarist Empire, as well as its sovereigns and "servants"-if only so they could be introduced as patriots. Putin had "recognized the enormous potential of cinema" and, of course, also of TV "for nation building purposes" 99 and for his patriotic campaign. As a result, history before the Bolshevik Revolution was integrated in a "patriotic re-interpretation" of Russian history as a whole. According to this characterization by the Society itself, the film obviously had to correspond with the aims cited. Its Chairman, the ministry of culture, Vladimir Medinskii, on the occasion of the production of Battalion, said that WWI "has always been badmouthed. " "We hope, " he added, that the film "will restore some honor in the minds of the people about their motherland. " 
